What brought you back to Stanford University?
I'm a Californian by upbringing. I love the area and I enjoyed my time here between '93 and '95. I was looking to do something that didn't involve running an organization and something where I could work on issues of substance. When I retired from Brookings, this was the kind of environment I was looking for.
How did you first become interested in Japan?
I took a sabbatical leave in 1968. I was teaching at Pomona College at the time. This was when Asia was very much in the consciousness of people: there was the Vietnam War, and the Cultural Revolution in China. And Japan was beginning to loom as a significant economic player in the region. I'd never been west of Long Beach at the time.
I learned about ICU [International Christian University in Tokyo], and though I had never studied the Japanese language, I wound up taking my sabbatical to teach at ICU. Between 1968 and '69 universities everywhere were in a turmoil. ICU went on student strike as did hundreds of other Japanese universities. So I had more time to study the language and the country.
The next year I had a fellowship to study in Washington, DC where I was assigned to the Secretary of State's office. They assumed I was a Japan specialist. And it goes on from there...
You have written about policy paralysis and economic stagnation in Japan. Have you seen any changes recently?
The biggest changes are in the private sector. Some companies have restructured in an impressive way to focus on profitability rather than sheer market share and have started to concentrate on core businesses in which they excel.
At the level of macroeconomic policy, there is wider acknowledgement of problems and a greater sense of urgency about tackling them. But, regrettably, I don't see great progress so far in overcoming those problems. Not least of which is that Japan is still very affluent and living standards have not been undermined by a decade of under-performance in the economy, and people are aware of the dislocations major reforms will bring to the middle class. They are more comfortable talking about reforms rather than doing them. Likewise, Koizumi talks about reform but is having trouble in mobilizing consensus. The weakness of the opposition is a telltale sign of why things haven't moved ahead.
Has Japan's role in the East Asia security alliance been diminished by its domestic problems and affected by the rising power of China?
The perception of Japan's strength has suffered, but ironically Japan has been gradually assuming a more ambitious role in the region. In the early '90s people expected Japan to take on greater responsibilities as a result of its economic prowess. In the period since, however, the stock market tanked and growth has slowed. Yet we saw the passage of the Peace-Keeping Operations Bill, and a larger assumption of responsibilities in the U.S.-Japan alliance, an acceptance of a role in counter-terrorism, and a more vigorous policy on Korea issues. It's taken a larger role in general, and this has no direct tie to its economic power.
Where do you see the US-Japan alliance going in the next decade? Are they" friends or rivals"?
It's a healthier relationship now. There is wide support for it in both countries, and the case for it has always been strong, as it is perceived in both governments. The Bush Administration recognizes the value in sticking with old friends and is committed to keeping the alliance in good shape.
The rise of China reminds people about the valuable insurance policy [the alliance] represents with its modest premiums. This doesn't prohibit Japan from pursuing a vigorous relationship with other countries.
What role do you see Japan playing in a possible scenario of normalization on the Korean peninsula?
Japan has the most to offer North Korea if it is prepared to address issues of concern to its neighbors. Normalization opens up opportunities like economic assistance, broader trading, and expanding flow of remittances from relatives living in Japan, and Japan could assist North Korea with entry into important international financial organizations like the IMF.
Japan has concerns about issues that North Korea has not fully addressed. The record of the last ten years shows Japan persevering to see that its concerns are addressed before offering economic inducements. [The A/PARC North Korea] conference [planned for] mid-February [2003] comes at a timely moment. There is a lot going on. The interesting angle of the conference is that it will bring knowledgeable practitioners from the key countries: the U.S., Japan, South Korea, Russia, and China. And this will happen right before the inauguration of the new South Korean president.
The Honorable Michael H. Armacost is Walter H. Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow at A/PARC.
A. Maria Toyoda is a Research Scholar at the Institute for International Studies
